Options
expenses and earnings management
by
Bruce Meyerson
Associated
Press
Now
that companies are required
to start deducting the expense
of employee stock options
from their profits, you’d think the math involved would be a
simple matter of subtraction.
It
turns out the new rules are so loose that companies are tweaking
mathematical assumptions in a way that cuts their options expense
by tens and hundreds of millions of dollars, judging from this
year’s annual reports.
These
assumptions are essential to calculating options expenses. What
may come as a surprise is just how much latitude the formulas
recommended by the Financial Accounting Standards Board and
the Securities and Exchange Commission give to companies in
estimating the value of options grants to employees.
Two
big variables stand out: predictions of how long employees will
wait to exercise their options and convert them to stock, and
calculations of the price volatility that would be associated
with those options if they were publicly traded. Lower numbers
for either projection will reduce the estimated value of an
option and the resulting expense a company has to report.
It
is entirely possible that companies are fine‑tuning their
assumptions appropriately since the SEC and FASB only began
clarifying many specifics of the new rules a little more than
a year ago. Still, the timing of these revised estimates are
unsettling even if they merely underscore the ease with which
the new calculations can be manipulated.
Consider
Google Inc. Despite the sharp swings that send its shares soaring
or slumping on any given day, Google nearly halved its volatility
assumption for 2005 from the rate it used in 2004, according
to its annual report. Using the new estimate, Google calculated
that the average value of an employee option granted last year
was $78.58. But had it kept the
volatility rate unchanged from 2004, that fair value–and
the expense
to be deducted from earnings–would have soared to roughly $130
per option.
Either
way, the impact on Google’s profits is tiny because most of
the non‑cash compensation it has paid employees since
going public in 2004 has been with stock awards rather than
options. But it’s easy to see how a reduced volatility assumption
would add up to big savings for technology companies that grant
hundreds of thousands of options to top executives.
Broadcom
Corp., a chipmaker whose shares have traded between
$20 and $50 in the last 52 weeks, sharply reduced its assumptions
for both volatility and the “expected life” of an option before
it’s exercised by an employee. Taken together, these revised
assumptions may understate Broadcom’s 2005 options expense by
$182 million, according to calculations by Gradient Analytics
Inc., an accounting research firm.
It’s
true that Broadcom’s daily swings eased some last year. And
the lower estimate may be partly explained by a switch to “implied”
volatility from a measurement based on historic trading data,
an approach recommended by the SEC and FASB. Implied volatility
is derived from the current price of publicly traded options,
providing a reflection of the market’s expectations for the
future
rather than past behavior.
One
possible concern raised by Gradient is that when the volatility
of a company’s stock and options
decrease, it’s generally accompanied
by an increase in the assumption for an option’s expected life,
not the simultaneous decrease shown by Broadcom.
The
conventional wisdom here is that when a stock is more volatile,
there are greater odds of a rapid rise that will motivate employees
to exercise their options and lock in those gains. With a less
volatile stock, they’re likely to hold their options longer
because they have less money at risk.
William
Ruehle, Broadcom’s chief financial officer, doesn’t dispute
that logic, but says his company’s revised assumption for the
life of an option is based on the actual investment behavior
of his employees. A steady rise in the stock in the past two
years has prompted more employees toexercise their options,
he said.
“That’s
just plain, actual experience–nothing magical or esoteric, just
plain methodology,” said Ruehle. “If you look at prior years,
that was when the market was melting down and most of the options
were under water. And when they’re under water, most people
aren’t going to exercise.”
While
a recent uptick in volatility could mean a bigger expense calculation
for options granted during 2006, Ruehle said Broadcom will stick
with implied volatility, ensuring the consistency mandated by
the SEC and FASB.
That
approach should offer greater clarity from year to year than
another allowed by regulators in which a blend of implied and
historic data is used to estimate volatility. Companies that
have adopted this approach include CBS Corp., discount broker
E‑Trade Financial Corp., sunglasses designer Oakley Inc.,
off‑price retailer TJX Cos., and software maker BEA Systems
Inc.
Since
the companies don’t offer specifics on how they blended the
volatility data for 2005, it may be unclear whether they alter
the mix in subsequent years. While ongoing data collection may
justify some tweaks, this lack of transparency could invite
opportunistic adjustments designed to reduce options expenses.
There’s
no logical way to rid accounting of assumptions, so it shouldn’t
be a shocker that the adoption of options expensing won’t bring
a cut‑and‑dried consistency to profit reports. That
said, it’ll be crucial to keep an eye on what companies ask
us to assume.